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Abstract We study the art market in the Venetian Republic from 1550 to 1750
analyzing the determinants of the prices (adjusted for the cost of living measured by
the price of wheat) of figurative paintings. Reputation of the painters, size of the
paintings and other quantifiable factors affect prices as expected. Other relevant
factors include the placement of the paintings (on altars, ceilings or walls), whose
impact reflects differences in demand elasticities. We find evidence of the law of
one price confirming price equalization between high and low demand geographical
destinations and between different subjects. Finally, in a Schumpeterian perspective,
we relate the temporal trend of the price of a representative painting with waves of
artistic innovations, whose peacks were in the 1500s and in the 1700s with a dark
Baroque age in the intermediate century.
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1 Introduction
The objective of this work is to analyze the market for figurative paintings traded in
the Venetian Republic between the second half of the XVI century and the first half
of the XVIII century, emphasizing the economic determinants of the real
compensations for these artworks, that is their prices adjusted for the cost of living.
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This allows one to test a number of economic predictions and to obtain the trend of
the real compensation for a representative painting produced in Venice over two
centuries, which provides interesting insights on the evolution of the art market.
The period under analysis starts at the end of Renaissance, during the so-called
Mannerist age (approximately 1550–1600), continues during the Baroque age
(approximately most of the 1600s) and includes what is usually called the Rococo`
age (up to the middle of the 1700s). In these centuries, the pricing of an art object was
perceived as highly subjective and largely dependent on taste, wealth and prestige of
the buyers, with little regard for factors affecting demand and supply. Honour and
prestige were claimed to be the drivers of social and economic activities rather than
profit-seeking behavior. In spite of this, we know that the market for paintings
reached a wide dimension, developed well organized institutions, introduced specific
contractual solutions, employed a high number of artists in competition with each
other, and served a wide audience of commissioners. As a consequence, we expect
that the price of paintings should be closely related to the general conditions of
demand and supply, and we test this hypothesis on a dataset based on the records
collected by Sohm (2010). This latter contains information on prices in silver ducats
and other features of paintings traded in the Venetian Republic.
We adjust nominal prices for the cost of living using data on the price of wheat,
as calculated by Malanima (2002). Wheat was an essential good for most of the
population and its price variations were likely to be reflected on those of many other
goods. Using this procedure we translate nominal prices in real terms reflecting the
changes in the cost of living during two centuries and thus we base our econometric
investigation on a more reliable measure of the values of the artworks, that is on
their ducats’ purchasing power.
The equilibrium prices of artworks can be interpreted in terms of hedonic prices
reflecting the expected aesthetic value of the paintings. Rosen (1974) has suggested
a two-step procedure to estimate demand and supply of particular hedonic features.1
Our interest, however, is not about identifying demand and supply for hedonic
features, but about correlations of demand and supply variables with the equilibrium
prices emerging in the market; therefore, we regress the log of the real
compensations on a number of control variables using a standard OLS estima-
tor—see Anderson (1974) and Chanel et al. (1996) for early empirical applications
of this methodology in the economics of art.
Our results show that the painters’ real compensation depended on their
reputation, which we capture by artists’ fixed effects, and, beyond this, that a
number of supply and demand factors affected the equilibrium compensations as
expected. A positive and concave relation between prices and size of paintings
reflects economies of scale in the production of artworks. Other relevant factors
include the placement of the paintings (on the altar, on the ceiling or on the walls),
whose impact reflects differences in demand elasticities, or in a religious or secular
building. We support the idea that patrons and artists adopted a typical solution to
1 Subsequent contributions included Brown and Rosen (1982), Bartik (1987) and Nerlove (1995) on
econometric theory and Witte et al. (1979), Palmquist (1984) and Bajari and Benkard (2005) on empirical
applications.
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the moral hazard problem: prices were made conditional on measurable features of
the paintings which were positively correlated with quality, the main one being the
number of human figures.2
We also evaluate whether the law of one price did hold checking for price
equalization between paintings sold in different points of sale (geographical
destinations) and paintings of different figurative subjects, that is sacred versus
mythological, historical and battles. The mobility of painters was high, therefore we
should expect that differentials in real compensations between high-demand and
low-demand towns or between different genres should be arbitraged away. Indeed,
this is what we find: Venice or foreign cities were not paying more their painters
compared to the countryside (as often thought because of higher demand), but they
were just selecting the best quality painters for more ambitious commissions.3
Analogously, we find price equalization between similar paintings of different
subject. We also check for measures of the rate of production of the painters without
clear-cut results.
Most importantly, we check how the price of a representative painting (with
given features by a given painter) changed over time. The two centuries analyzed
here were characterized by the golden age associated with the innovative masters of
late Renaissance and Mannerism (Titian, Veronese and Tintoretto), by the dark age
of the Baroque period in which Venetian painters contributed marginally to the
evolution of art history, and by the renaissance of the Venetian Rococo` period with
innovators that influenced the western art history in a radical way (Tiepolo, Ricci,
Canaletto). Controlling for paintings’ and painters’ features, we find evidence of
high and declining prices in the late XVI century, low prices during two-thirds of
the XVII century and increasing prices in the last part of the same century and
during the first half of the XVIII century. This is consistent with the hypothesis that
the compensation of the artistic activity may have contributed to determine artistic
innovations, promoting the two prominent periods of Venetian art and providing a
possible market-based explanation for the decline of artistic achievements during
the intermediate phase. Not only was art a full-fledged market, but the market may
have driven art as well, an hypothesis that awaits for further investigation.
Our analysis is related to a wide literature in cultural economics investigating
data on secondary sales in modern art auctions. Starting with Anderson (1974) and
Baumol (1986), this literature has been aimed at estimating the return from the
investment in art (see among others Frey and Pommerehne 1989; Buelens and
Ginsburgh 1993; Mei and Moses 2002) or at pointing out some determinants of art
values through hedonic regressions (Chanel et al. 1996; Dorchy and Ginsburgh
1993; Galenson and Weinberg 2000; Nahm 2010). The first work to consider data
on primary sales has been the one by Rengers and Velthuis (2002), whose focus was
on contemporary Dutch artists.
2 See Holmstrom (1979). One of the first works to point out (different) contractual solutions to trade
problems emerging in a medieval environment is by Greif et al. (1994).
3 This selection effect is reminiscent of the one pointed out by Melitz (2003) in the literature on trade
with heterogenous firms: in particular, only the most productive painters could sell their works abroad.
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A smaller literature has been focused on historical art markets. For instance, De
Marchi (1995) and Montias (2002) have emphasized the importance of economic
incentives in shaping the Dutch golden age of Baroque paintings,4 while Cecchini
(2000) and Fantoni et al. (2003) provide an economic history background on the
Venetian market.5
Ge´rin-Jean (2003) has analyzed the prices of heterogeneous artworks (statues,
decorative objects and also paintings) from inventories (and not original contracts)
of the Medici period, but the procedure used for converting prices into a unique
currency and the adjustment for inflation, using an index computed for Southern
England, appear inaccurate. O’Malley (2005) and Spear and Sohm (2010) have
collected data on prices of paintings, but without performing econometric analysis.
Etro and Pagani (2012) have provided a first exploration of data on paintings of the
XVII century produced in the main five Italian art centres (Rome, Florence, Venice,
Bologna and Naples); however, their analysis was focused on economic history
aspects and on the life cycle of the painters, and was based on nominal prices of
paintings without adjusting for the cost of living. Etro et al. (2011) have analyzed a
matched painter-patron dataset on the Baroque market in Rome focusing on price
differentials between genres such as portraits, still lifes, landscapes, genre paintings
and figurative paintings. Here we limit our analysis to figurative paintings of the
Venetian Republic, we adjust prices for the cost of living to obtain a better measure
of the real compensation of the painters, and we investigate additional economic
aspects of art pricing.
The article is organized as follows: Sect. 2 describes the market and derives a
number of theoretical implications, Sect. 3 presents the dataset and shows the
econometric analysis and Sect. 4 concludes.
2 The Venetian market for figurative oil paintings
Figurative paintings of sacred, mythological and historical subjects represented the
main products of the painters active in Venice. By the mid-XVI century, they were
largely painted in oil mainly on rectangular canvases and with simple frames.6
Artists were organized in guilds and had to pay an entry fee to access then and
trade their paintings under common rules. However, one should not think of the
guild as a collusion device: competition was widespread. First of all, most of the
leading painters were enrolled, but many low quality painters were able to avoid
4 Vaubel (2005) analyses the role of competition in the rise of Renaissance and Baroque music.
5 Some of these works try to characterize the private demand of paintings, and in particular its elasticity
with respect to wealth during the 1600s. The wealth elasticity appears above unity in the Low Countries
and below unity in Venice. This suggests that paintings were a typical luxury good in the Dutch market,
not in the less developed Venetian market (Cecchini, 2000). However, the latter was also characterized by
a large religious demand (limited in the Netherlands due to iconoclasm).
6 In the previous centuries, paintings were mainly in tempera on wood panels, covered with a gold
background and surrounded by expensive carved and gilded frames. The cost of the woodwork was quite
high and typically born by the painters: O’Malley (2005) estimates it between 15 and 30 % of the total
price (another 30 % was also spent for gold leafs and gilding). This makes it convenient for us to focus on
later paintings whose preparation did not include this cost.
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enrollment and practice the art without following the basic rules decided by the
guild.7
Second, competition was strong and sometimes even predatory, with painters
undercutting each other to conquer commissions: during the late 1500s, Tintoretto
was an aggressive leader in this market, repeatedly using discounts and preemptive
gifts to conquer commissions.8 He also kept displaying his works on the streets
against a major rule of the guild. Overall, the market could be seen as characterized
by competition in prices between differentiated producers and by endogenous entry
of these producers (effective mobility was extremely high).
Most commissions were formalized in detailed contracts signed in front of
notaries, and defining the price and the mutual responsibilities of the patron and the
artist. Early Renaissance contracts (from the XV century) did not require the painter
to directly paint the altarpiece: subcontracting was allowed (though rare) except
in the presence of Sua mano (his own ‘‘hand’’) clauses (see O’Malley 2005, p. 3).
In the more advanced period under our consideration, however, the value of artistic
personalities and signatures became more important and all commissions were
directly undertaken by the painter, at most with the help of assistants for background
and decorative details. Contracts were incomplete, however, because the quality of
the paintings could be judged by the commissioner (or by dealers and other painters
as advisers), but it could be hardly defined ex ante in the contracts. Painters did care
about their reputation, which led them to exert some effort, but the market
developed additional incentive mechanisms to limit the conflicts of interests. Many
contracts were contingent, involving payment in three tranches, with continued
payment being dependent on a positive interim assessment. Some even had a clause
affecting the final tranche: it could exceed a contracted-for amount or be less than it,
depending on satisfaction.9 All this was, however, insufficient to fully solve the
conflict of interest between artists and commissioners, and other incentive
mechanisms could have emerged.
The demand for oil paintings of religious subject derived mainly from new
churches, to decorate their main altar and the lateral chapels (most of which were
private and, therefore, under the budget of wealthy patrons) or their naves’ walls and
ceilings, and from old churches replacing ruined (or stylistically out of fashion)
7 According to Cecchini (2000) the enrollment could be seen simply as ‘‘an element certifying quality for
the artistic work, or a sort of signal of the insiders’’ to distinguish the masters of the Venetian school from
students, occasional imitators and genre painters. For instance, in 1596, the Venetian guild sued two
minor painters, Contarini and Malombra for refusing to join the association. They defended themselves
claiming that they were only occasional painters practicing painting for delight and not for money. The
guild rebutted this showing proofs of payment and the court punished them. Contarini joined the guild in
1597, but Malombra kept painting without enrolling in the guild for other 20 years (see Cecchini 2000,
p. 160–161). On the Venetian art market see also Dal Pozzolo and Tedoldi (2003).
8 In 1564 the Scuola di San Rocco (School of San Rocco) asked a few painters to submit drawings for a
ceiling painting. Tintoretto circumvented the competition (of Veronese, Zuccaro and Salviati) installing
as a gift a quickly finished painting during the night before adjudication and, with this, he conquered a
multi-decade leadership in the decoration of the boardroom, chapter hall and meeting hall of the Scuola.
Nevertheless, his prices remained low, as a consequence of the competitive entry pressure that was still
present. See Etro (2006) for an economic theory of aggressive leadership in front of entry pressure.
9 Interestingly, the three-tranche structure was already common in fifteenth-century Flemish towns. We
are grateful to a referee for comments on these aspects.
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paintings. Moreover, demand of religious, historical and mythological subjects
derived also from laic patrons: public buildings (such as Palazzo Ducale in Venice
or Palazzo della Podesta` in Padua) and private collections (as the one of Stefano
Conti in Venice in the mid XVII century). Bigger and richer towns, where more
churches were built, more prestigious buildings existed and wealthier patrons were
active, were clearly demanding more and higher quality paintings.
The supply of paintings depended on the number of painters of different quality
available and on their productivity. It is reasonable to expect that the supply of low
quality painters was rather elastic, while that of high quality painters, on which we
focus, was constrained by the availability of innovative talents in the Venetian
market and therefore was more rigid, at least in the short run.10 Unfortunately, we
do not have reliable measures of productivity, but we will provide a preliminary
attempt to build a proxy for productivity based on the number of surviving
commissions.
In the rest of this section we describe how other basic factors may have affected
demand and supply and therefore the equilibrium price of the paintings, and finally
we discuss how to interpret the residual temporal trend of the real compensation of
the painters.
2.1 Aesthetic value and pricing by reputation
There is no doubt that the aesthetic value of a painting as perceived by its
contemporary audience should be the first determinant of its demand and of the final
price. However, in a primary market based on commissions, prices are established
before the paintings are done and quality can be hardly determined ex ante in a
verifiable way. Therefore, prices should depend on the expected quality and its
determinants. The main one is the reputation of the painter for producing works of
quality.11
10 The productivity of the painters had two elements. The first was their ability to produce high quality
works, which dependend on talent and also on experience, at least up to a certain age–see Etro and Pagani
(2012) for a related discussion on the life-cycle profile of Baroque painters in Italy. The second element
of productivity is the rate of production of paintings, whose impact on prices is ambiguous: on one side,
more productive painters could be available to reduce their prices, but on the other side a Veblen effect
may have taken place (the willingness to pay of the buyers could have been increasing for fashionable
painters that produced and sold more paintings).
11 We have a wide documentary evidence on the reputation of the artists in their ages. A direct account of
ranking between painters comes from Guido Reni, probably the most highly regarded painter of the
1600s. In a letter of 1628 he divided painters in three categories of high, medium and low quality, and
gave us a witty description of the relation between (his) quality and price. When asked who was the best
painter between him and the main competitor Guercino, Guido Reni replied as follows: ‘‘I am… and I
could tell you the reasons in terms of art but you would not understand them. Therefore these three simple
reasons will do. First, because my pictures sell better than his. I, in fact, taught him how to be paid well.
Secondly, because he fishes out my ideas and tries to work the way I do. I never followed his way of
doing things. On the contrary I’ve always kept my distance from him. Finally, because all the other artists
follow my style and not his’’ (Spear and Sohm 2010, p. 152). Another treatise by Giovanni Domenico
Ottonelli and the painter Pietro da Cortona of 1652, divided artists in three similar categories: those
absolutely deserving to be called excellent, those who lived without the benefit of much fame and the
pittori infimi.
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Each painter can be seen as characterized by a specific style more or less
appreciated and priced, therefore we will control for reputation through dummies
for the artists, as suggested by Chanel et al. (1996). Interestingly, this allows us to
provide a temptative ranking of the painters for the payment they could receive for a
representative artwork.
2.2 Size of paintings and the returns to scale
A number of empirical studies on modern art auctions have investigated the relation
between size of paintings and prices. Anderson (1974) conjectured a relative
preference of modern collectors for small paintings and therefore higher prices, but
found mixed results in different periods and, overall, an elasticity of the price with
respect to size of 0.38. Subsequent studies on secondary sales have generally found
a positive relation for modern and contemporary paintings.12
Rengers and Velthuis (2002) find the same for primary sales of contemporary art.
However, the relation between price and size of old master paintings may have
followed a different logic.
Consider the demand side first. According to Baroque esthetics, the value of art
could be hardly measured in square meters.13 There is a weak evidence that the
willingness to pay of the patrons could increase with the size of paintings. Size was
often constrained by a fixed space in the church or in another location, and therefore
it was typically exogenous. O’Malley (2005, Ch. 5) provides some documentary
evidence for the fact that the willingness to pay of Renaissance commissioners was
mainly dependent on elements as their own prestige and ‘‘honour’’ rather than on
objective features of the paintings.
On the supply side, size may have been more important. Painters may have taken
it in consideration when they were bargaining on prices: if anything, one may think
that the cost of the main inputs as labor time, oil colors and help from assistants
(often paid by day), should be positively related with the size of paintings, and this
should be reflected in prices. However, while costs were increasing in the size,
returns to scale were not constant: scale economies were likely to be present. A
painting of any size required some time for thinking about the composition and for
working on preparatory drawings or a small sketch painting, which justified a less
than proportional relation between size and prices. Moreover, even if there was a
tendency to fill all parts of a painting with figures and objects (including complex
still lifes) and background decorations (either with architectonical settings or
landscapes), it is without doubt that larger altarpieces had larger areas that required
less work. For this reason, one may expect a positive but concave relation between
prices and size.
12 In particular, see the semiparametric partial linear regressions presented by Nahm (2010) for
contemporary Korean art.
13 In 1587 the minor painter Giovan Battista Armenini wrote an essay ‘‘On the true precepts of the art of
painting’’ supporting the idea that pricing by size debases the noble art of painting and encourages artists
to be sloppy and finish too rapidly their paintings. In 1667, the more famous painter Pietro Cortona, while
petitioning for a payment for a work in St. Peter’s, wrote in third person that ‘‘he has never experienced
that paintings are bought and sold by the palmo [size] and measurement’’ (Spear and Sohm 2010, p. 50).
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The evidence provided by O’Malley (2005) on the prices of Renaissance
altarpieces is in favour of this but inconclusive for the limited size of the sample.14
The evidence by Sohm (2010, pp. 240–244) on later Venetian paintings is more
reliable for the larger number of observations, but inconclusive for the lack of any
control variable.15
2.3 Placement of the paintings and price elasticities
An interesting determinant of the demand for a painting is its final position: the
hierarchy of spaces within churches and buildings may have affected the willingness
to pay for paintings and their prices. Looking at Venice, Sohm (2010, p. 235)
notices that the ‘‘cheapest paintings were placed on ceilings (13 ducats per square
meter), closest to heaven but visually marginal, followed by wall paintings (18
ducats per square meter), on average 38 % more than ceiling paintings. Meter-for-
meter, however, altarpieces brought in the highest prices at over twice as much as
ceiling paintings (27 ducats per square meter).’’ This comparison takes size into
account, but of course ignores other aspects. It may be that marginal positions were
destined to low quality painters implying lower quality and lower prices, and vice
versa for the central positions. What one should verify is whether the same painting
was paid more or less only for being destined to a different position.
From an economic point of view, one can easily realize that the demand of oil
paintings for altars and ceilings was more rigid than the demand for wall paintings.
Oil paintings were by far a forced solution for the decoration of the main altars of
churches and chapels, whose number was also exogenously limited, at least in the
short and medium run. Ceilings were mostly decorated with frescoes in the rest of
Italy, but not in Venice for the problems related with humidity: therefore oil
paintings became the standard solution for Venetian ceilings as well. For the
decoration of walls, however, Venetian churches and buildings had multiple
alternatives available (including sculptures, bronze decorations, tapestry, stucco and
wood works). Finally, the space on walls was wider than the space on the altar for
obvious architectonical reasons. Therefore, the demand for oil paintings on walls’
decoration was much more elastic with respect to the price than the demand for
altarpieces and paintings for the ceilings. As a consequence, one may expect that
commissioners were ready to give higher monetary incentives to obtain higher
quality works for altarpieces and for paintings for ceilings compared to what they
were ready to pay for providing incentives to exert extra quality in wall paintings.
14 In the period 1450–1550 the average price of altarpieces between 2 and 4 square meters was 62 gold
florins (out of 24 observations), the price between 4 an 7 square meters was 107 florins (for 22
observations), between 7 and 9 was 174 florins (for 9 observations) and between 9 an 12 it was 166 florins
(two observations). See O’Malley (2005).
15 The average price of paintings increases with size up to ten square meters. However, above this
threshold ‘‘the numbers become erratic, dropping by a third or more for sizes between 10 and 25 square
meters. Here, mysteriously, it appears that painters were paid less for larger paintings than for smaller
ones’’ (Sohm 2010, p. 241).
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2.4 Number of figures and incentive mechanisms
There are not deep artistic reasons for which the counting of the human figures in a
painting should affect prices, especially if size of paintings and quality associated
with each painter are already taken into account in the compensations. Indeed,
O’Malley (2005) does not find a positive correlation between price and number of
figures during Renaissance (XIV and XV centuries).16 At first sight, things do not
seem to have changed much in the later period, at least in Venice. Here, Sohm
(2010) does not find documentary evidence of an explicit impact of the number of
figures on prices.17
However, prices may have been decided on the basis of the number of figures
even without stating a price per figure in the contracts. Further agreements on the
number of figures may have been established in separate notes, letters or even verbal
communications. For instance, this happened in one of the rare epistolary
negotiations survived until our days and involving the Venetian painters Liberi
and Zanchi (see Spear and Sohm 2010, pp. 13–15).
From an economic point of view, there could be an incentive for the adoption of
prices increasing in the number of figures. If contracts could not specify quality and
moral hazard was a relevant issue (because quality required also costly effort), an
explicit or implicit contract maximizing the payoff of the patrons had to be based on
other quantifiable variables correlated with quality (Holmstrom 1979).18
In the case of figurative paintings, this was possible through the number of
human figures: the variety and complexity of the composition, summarized by the
number of players, had a positive, though partial, correlation with the final quality.
Moreover, painters were often focusing their own effort on human figures and
especially on difficult parts as the heads, delegating less relevant parts to their own
assistants19: therefore, a higher number of figures was a proxy for a wider direct
intervention of the painters in the overall execution, and consequently for higher
quality. Finally, between the main protagonists of each composition, patrons highly
valued the presence of their own portraits and those of their relatives and assistants:
therefore, a larger number of figures was often a device to introduce portraits that
16 Moreover, she uses documentary, graphic and painted evidence to show that the subject matter of
altarpieces was often discussed after signing the contracts, sometimes recorded in separate notes and often
changed without affecting the force of the initial contracts. In particular, during Renaissance ‘‘the number
of main figures planned for a work might be increased after a contract was signed without having any
impact upon the fee recorded in the notarial agreement’’ (p. 136).
17 ‘‘Of the 300 or so contracts and many more letters, diaries, etc. that have been gathered for this study,
only three (all from the first half of the sixteenth century) give a specific figure price’’ (p. 244). Moreover,
Sohm (2010) does not emphasize any correlation between number of figures and prices in the data. He
also provides stylistic explanations for this based on the traditional distinction (going back to Vasari)
between the Florentine focus on figure drawing and the Venetian focus on colouring: ‘‘What might be
concluded from the Venetian tendency to price paintings by size rather than the number of figures? It
could be taken to confirm an opinion that Venetian painters considered painting much more than just a
figural problem. What constitutes the surface or adheres to it—color and brushwork—are just as
important.’’
18 See Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) for a classic formulation of the principal-agent theory.
19 For instance, detailed documentary evidence of this division of work is available for the workshop of
Strozzi (Cecchini, 2000, p. 164).
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could please the patrons and enhance their perception of quality. Etro et al. (2011)
and Etro and Pagani (2012) have supported the same idea in related investigations of
Italian paintings of the XVII century, but here we test the hypothesis within a more
detailed empirical model.
2.5 The law of one price
If painters could freely work and move, we may expect that, at each point in time, a
canvas of given size painted by a given painter should have the same price whatever
was its subject and wherever it was sold. We can test the first hypothesis looking at
figurative paintings of different subjects, such as sacred subjects, mythological (and
allegorical) subjects, historical subjects (including literary and heraldic ones) and
battles, and asking whether, after controlling for demand and supply conditions,
price equalization did hold. In spite of substantial differences between average
nominal prices (193 ducats for religious paintings, 153 for mythological ones, 184
for historical ones and 329 for the battles) we will confirm that price equalization
between subjects did hold. Etro et al. (2011) have investigated a similar hypothesis
in Baroque Rome, finding price equalization not only between different subjects of
figurative paintings, but also between figurative paintings and other artistic genres
such as still lifes, portraits, genre paintings and landscapes.
The second hypothesis requires a look at the points of sale of the paintings. A
standard common-place in art history is that prices were higher in the major cities
because income and demand were higher compared to smaller towns or to the
countryside.20 O’Malley (2005, p.136–142) looks at a very limited dataset on
Renaissance altarpieces suggesting that prices in Florence were higher than in the
rest of Central Italy and Venice (but lower than in Rome) in the second half of the
XV century, but the relation reversed in the first half of the XVI century.
Comparisons between main art centres and countryside are even less conclusive for
the limited size of the sample and the lack of controlling factors. ‘‘Before 1450,
prices in Florence and Siena were higher than those paid in provincial towns, but in
the later fifteenth century the contrary was the case, and Florentine prices continued
to be lower than those in provincial towns in the early sixteenth century. Venetian
painters may have had an opposite experience, that is, between 1450 and 1500,
prices may have been lower in Venice than they were on the mainland, but the
sample is very small and conclusions are tentative. After 1500, prices in Venice
seem to have been higher than those paid in the Venetian provinces’’ (O’Malley,
2005, p. 142). Looking at average nominal prices in the subsequent two centuries,
Sohm (2010, pp. 234-235) finds that Venice priced at 218 ducats, Vicenza at 148,
Verona at 119 and other minor Veneto towns at 126, while Bergamo reached a
higher average price of 360 ducats. Moreover, he finds justifications for the outliers:
‘‘Bergamo places first because the deputati of S. Maria Maggiore were both wealthy
20 In 1625, Fra Atanasio, an art dealer who was negotiating an altarpiece by the painter Cerano in Milan,
told the patron that the painter would have probably accepted 250 scudi, but also that if Cerano were to go
to Rome he would be paid 500 scudi, claiming the existence of a high price differential between a large
art centre such as Rome and a smaller (but not even peripherical) centre such as Milan (Sohm 2010,
p. 233).
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and ambitious. The bottom ranking of Verona confirms Scipione Maffei’s account
in 1732 of seventeenth century Verona as a cultural backwater.’’ These consider-
ations must have been relevant, but from an economic point of view the high
mobility of painters suggests that important adjustment mechanisms should have
been at work to equalize prices. To test for this we need to verify if the
compensation in real terms was significantly different between different points of
sale after controlling for all demand and supply features.
Such a test of the law of one price is somewhat related to the test for price
differentials in contemporary auctions located in different towns and held by
different auction houses (such as Sotheby’s and Christie’s versus minor ones):
results in those cases are mixed (Chanel et al. 1996; Dorchy and Ginsburgh 1993),
but one should keep in mind that the market for auctions is highly concentrated and
the two dominant companies can adopt differentiated strategies in selecting and
pricing objects. This was not the case for the points of sale of our paintings.
2.6 Temporal trends
A large part of the literature on modern art pricing has been focused on estimating
the return from the investment in art from data on secondary sales (Anderson, 1974;
Baumol, 1986; Frey and Pommerehne 1989; Locatelli-Biey and Zanola 1999; Mei
and Moses 2002).
Looking at data on primary sales, the focus must shift to the simple trend of the
prices in the market, which can derive from economic mechanisms, but can also
shed light on art historical issues. Ideally, after controlling for all the determinants
of demand and supply of the paintings and the painters, a temporal trend of the
equilibrium real compensations for paintings of given features should reflect real
changes in the remuneration of the artistic activity over time. Given the number of
painters active in a region and their productivity, an increase in the real
compensation should reflect increased demand, which could attract painters from
other regions or, in the long run, induce more talents to follow the artistic career. If
this is the case, temporal trends due to demand shifts may generate endogenous
artistic consequences.
The analysis of the time trend for Venetian paintings over two centuries may
provide new insights on the artistic cycles of this region. In particular, it may
contribute to explain the alternance of two periods of innovative creativity (for an
art historical account see Sohm, 2010). The first is the golden age of Venetian art
started with the innovations of Renaissance masters such as Antonello da Messina,
Giovanni Bellini, Giorgione and the young Titian, and continued with the work of
Mannerist masters such as the older Titian, Veronese and Tintoretto. In particular,
Antonello introduced oil colors in Italian art, Giorgione and Titian introduced
artistic innovations in the use and mix of colors (that led Vasari to speak of a
Venetian school focused on color, distinct from the Florentine school focused on
drawing), and Veronese and Tintoretto pushed this to its limits, introducing
respectively a new radiant palette and a new sketchy style which will be largely
copied during the following periods. After the death of the three main mannerist
masters, the Baroque century is usually regarded as a dark age of Venetian art, in
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which even the leading painters kept imitating the style of the Mannerist masters
without introducing substantial innovations and remaining largely unaffected by the
artistic ideas emerging in Rome at the same time. It was only at the turn of the
century that a second renaissance of Venetian art took place and a new style based
on the bright and sparkling colors used by Tiepolo in his frescoes and Ricci in his
canvases influenced the international Rococo` style, while the vedute by Canaletto
(who started employing a camera obscura to achieve maximum accuracy) were
renovating the landscape genre.
In a Schumpeterian perspective, such a path of artistic innovations could be have
been driven by a U-shaped pattern of the real compensations for painters in the
Venetian Republic: decreasing compensations from the artistic activity between the
end of the XVI century and the beginning of the XVII century could have motivated
lower engagement and innovation in the Venetian art market during the Baroque
age compared to the earlier Mannerist phase, and increasing returns during the end
of the XVII century and the beginning of the XVIII century could have motivated
the more dynamic artistic creativity of the Rococo` period.21
Aggregate phenomena may have been in the background: the gradual decline of
Venice as an economic power during the 1500s induced a decline in the Venetian
aggregate demand, and the emerging globalization during the 1700s induced a
recovery of the aggregate demand.
3 Data and empirical analysis
The data used for the empirical analysis are drawn from original commissions to
painters. The main source of the dataset is Sohm (2010), who collected data on
prices (from original contracts and other documentary evidence) and other
characteristics of 254 oil paintings made between 1551 and 1746 by 61 artists
located in the Venetian Republic (see Table 1 for a list of the artists).22
We can fairly look at the sample as representative of the (many more)
commissions for oil paintings that took place at the time. The main reason is that the
survival of documentary evidence on these contracts for about four centuries is
largely random: fires, wars and other accidental events have spread losses of
documents across all the original archives.
Prices are expressed in Venetian silver ducats. The second half of the XVI
century was characterized by a sustained inflation (due to the arrival of silver from
the Americas), and the first half of the XVIII century exhibited wide price
variability. Therefore, we take into account changes in the price level over the two
21 Notice that such a pattern for the real compensation of paintings is not trivial, because nominal prices
of Italian paintings appear to be constant or slightly increasing during the same period (Etro and Pagani,
2012). Moreover, preliminary investigations on paintings in Rome show the opposite pattern: an inverse
U shape of the real compensations, which is actually consistent with the pick of creativity in Rome during
the early XVII century.
22 We checked one by one the data, especially to separate multiple commissions (which required
information on size of the paintings and number of figures). We also added additional data concerning the
age of painters at the time of execution and other qualitative features from standard art history sources.
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Table 1 Artists included in this
study, mean price and number of
observations
Artist Mean price
(silver ducats)
Nr of
observations
Titian (1489–1576) 343 4
Franco (1500–1561) 60 1
Campagnola (1500–1564) 78 1
Ponchino (1500–1570) 270 1
Schiavone (1510–1563) 60 1
Bassano, J. (1510–1592)
and L. (1557–1622)
80 6
Brusasorci (1516–1567) 78 1
Michieli (1516–1578) 130 2
Tintoretto (1518–1594) 82 24
Salviati G. (1520–1575) 60 1
Vecellio, C. (1521–1601) 81 2
Moroni (1522–1578) 405 1
Farinati (1524–1606) 45 26
Licinio (1527–1591) 60 1
Veronese (1528–1588) 113 11
Varotari, D. (1539–1596) 44 1
Zuccaro (1539–1609) 1,000 1
Palma the Younger (1548–1628) 244 28
Bassano, F. (1549–1592) 57 4
Cavagna (1556–1627) 56 4
Maganza (1556–1640) 9 1
Tintoretto, D. (1560–1635) 150 1
Marco Vicentino (1573–1638) 140 1
Maffeo Verona (1576–1618) 30 1
Turchi (1578–1649) 296 1
Strozzi (1581–1644) 32 1
Padovanino (1588–1649) 136 3
Prudenti (1591–1665) 350 1
Renieri (1591–1667) 61 1
Heintz (1600–1678) 200 1
Vecchia (1602–1678) 150 1
Maffei (1605–1660) 120 6
Liberi (1605–1687) 363 6
Ricchi (1606–1675) 151 4
Massimo da Verona (1607–1679) 221 1
Ruschi (1610–1661) 297 3
Carpioni (1613–1678) 65 2
Beverensi (1624–1694) 60 1
Triva (1626–1669) 76 2
Zanchi (1631–1722) 287 19
Loth (1632–1698) 726 1
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centuries under consideration. To this aim, we convert nominal prices in real terms
by first changing ducats in the units of account, the liras (according to the exchange
rate of 1 ducat per 6.4 liras), and, secondly, by using information regarding the
quantity of Venetian liras necessary to buy a hundred kilograms of wheat, as
calculated by Malanima (2002) for each decade. Better inflation indexes are not
available, but wheat was an essential good for most of the population and its price
variations were likely to be reflected in those of many other goods. Using this
procedure we translate nominal prices in real terms reflecting the cost of living and
its changes during the period under analysis and, thus, we base our econometric
investigation on a more reliable measure of artworks values, that is on ducats’
purchasing power.
Important information on artworks’ characteristics that potentially influence the
price is available in the dataset or was collected by us: author, title, subject (sacred,
mythological, historical or a battle), size of the painting, number of figures included
in the composition, town and building where it was planned to be located, position
in the building (i.e. on a main or secondary altar, on the ceiling, or on lateral walls
including the organ), commissioner’s type, that is whether the artwork was made for
a religious or for a secular commissioner, date of commission and age of the artist
when the painting was made. We cannot control directly for the productivity of the
painters because we have estimates of the number of paintings produced only for the
most famous ones; nevertheless, we can use the information on the ratio between
the number of paintings of each artist in the dataset and the length of his/her artistic
Table 1 continued
When the birthdate is uncertain
from historical sources, the best
estimate is used
Artist Mean price
(silver ducats)
Nr of
observations
Giordano (1634–1705) 290 2
Celesti (1637–1712) 154 10
Fumiani (1645–1710) 100 4
Pittoni, F. (1645–1724) 44 1
Prunato (1654–1728) 170 1
Dorigny (1654–1742) 198 1
Molinari (1655–1704) 105 2
Trevisani (1656–1746) 600 1
Lazzarini (1657–1730) 75 5
Ricci (1659–1734) 352 20
Marchesini (1663–1738) 150 1
Canziani (1664–1730) 120 1
Balestra (1666–1740) 245 6
Bellotti, G.B. (1667–1730) 170 1
Pellegrini, G.A. (1675–1741) 270 1
Piazzetta (1682–1754) 141 2
Grone (1685–1750) 58 1
Pittoni, G.B. (1687–1767) 417 7
Tiepolo (1696–1770) 466 8
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life (within the time-frame of the dataset): if our sample is a random sample of the
production of the time, this ratio should be positively correlated with the
productivity of the artists.
Tables 2 and 3 show a partial list of the variables we used in the empirical
analysis together with their main summary statistics. Given that many of the
continuous variables we used are not normally distributed, in order to better
describe them in addition to their mean and standard deviation we report also their
maximum and minimum values, the median, the skewness and the kurtosis. The
average price of a painting was 193.5 Venetian silver ducats, while the median
value was much lower (100 silver ducats). However, a large variation in prices can
be observed, with prices ranging between a minimum of 5 to a maximum of 2,306
silver ducats. To get a clearer picture of the price distribution in our sample, the
histogram in Fig. 1 illustrates the class-price distribution. The modal price value
was between 50 and 100 silver ducats, with around 27 % of observations; another
24 % of the paintings were paid less than 50 silver ducats while less than 20 % were
paid more than 300 ducats. Also painting’s size and the number of figures vary a lot
across paintings and their distribution is far from being a symmetric one: the
average painting’s size is 12.4 square meters but while the smallest painting in the
dataset measures 0.4 square meters, the largest size is around 85 square meters. The
average oil painting contains 10 figures; nonetheless, the number ranges from 1
figure to the 59 figures of Tintoretto’s Last Judgement. Around 40 % of the sample
is made by artworks whose final location is lateral wall of a church or a secular
building, altarpieces account for 53 % of the paintings, almost entirely in churches,
and paintings for the ceiling are 7 % of the total.
In our empirical analysis the dependent variable is the ratio between the price of
painting i executed at time t by painter j, pijt, and the price of wheat at time t, Pt. Our
baseline regression is the following:
ln
pijt
Pt
 
¼ a þ bXij þ cArtistj þ d1ageij þ d2age2ij þ h1tij þ h2t2ij þ eij ð1Þ
where we control for a number of characteristics of the paintings, for artist dum-
mies, for the life-cycle of the painters with a linear and a quadratic term in the age of
the painter at the time of the commission, and for the time trend through a quadratic
specification. We also perform a number of robustness checks. First of all, we model
the determinants of prices across two levels: paintings and artists, adopting a
multilevel linear regression approach as in Rengers and Velthuis (2002). More
Table 2 Summary statistics-continuous variables
Variables Mean Median Min Max Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis
Price 193.5 100 5 230 245.8 4.0 28.1
Size 12.4 6.9 0.4 84.8 14.1 2.6 10.7
Nr figures 9.8 7 1 59 9.4 2.6 11.3
Age 52.2 51 22 81 13.6 0.0 2.0
NP/AL 0.26 0.27 0.01 0.56 0.18 0.19 1.65
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specifically, we estimate a fixed-effects model that includes explanatory variables at
both artist and painting levels. In this way, we shift the regression line up or down
according to each artist so that the fitted regression line for a given artist will differ
from the average line in its intercept.23
Table 3 Summary statistics-
discrete variables
Variables Mean Std Dev
Religious commissioner 0.76 0.43
Altar 0.53 0.50
Wall 0.40 0.49
Ceiling 0.07 0.26
Venice 0.41 0.49
Minor destination 0.22 0.42
Verona/Vincenza 0.15 0.36
Bergamo 0.05 0.22
Padua 0.04 0.20
Foreign destination 0.10 0.30
Treviso 0.03 0.17
Sacred 0.82 0.38
History 0.07 0.26
Myth 0.07 0.26
Battle 0.03 0.16
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Fig. 1 Distribution of paintings’ prices in silver ducats
23 The multilevel model is estimated as a robustness check although our preferred model is the OLS,
given that in many cases we have very few paintings per artist.
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Second, we control for the time trend through 10-year time dummy variables in
order to compare the non-parametric specification to our quadratic specification.
Finally, we refine the baseline regression introducing dummies for the different
figurative genres (sacred, mythological, historical, and battles) and the ratio between
the number of paintings of each artist in the dataset and the length of his/her artistic
life (NP/AL) as a rough measure of artists’ productivity.24
Table 4 shows OLS estimates of the price equation. Coefficients of the artist fixed-
effects based on the baseline specification of Table 4 (columns 1–2) are shown in
Table 5. The first remarkable thing to notice is that the adjusted R2 is equal to 73 % in
the baseline regression, pointing out a good overall fit and providing first evidence of
the existence of a systematic pattern in the process of price determination (in line with
studies that control for a similar number of factors including the artist dummies, such
as Chanel et al. 1996; Dorchy and Ginsburgh 1993; Nahm, 2010).25
Moreover, generally the estimated parameters take the expected sign. The artist
dummies rank the painters for their compensation in terms of comparable purchasing
power from selling a representative painting (see Table 5): from the top we find
Ruschi, Liberi, Giordano, Zanchi, Balestra, Triva, Palma the Younger, Michieli and
Ricci (the omitted one is Farinati, the least paid artist of the sample). It is remarkable
that some of the most famous painters (according to our contemporary evaluation)
appear only in the middle of the ranking and, overall, the price differentials between
painters appear to be rather limited (at least compared to the differentials in prices
today). Prices appear increasing and concave in the age of the painters, in line with
what found by Etro and Pagani (2012) for Baroque Italy. The age of maximum
appreciation in the market Age ¼ d^1
.
2d^2 can be calculated as 74 years.
The results highlight a premium of around 9 % per square meters and thus they
confirm that larger paintings were paid more. Additionally, we find evidence of
weak scale economies in the production technology, as suggested by the negative
and significant coefficient of squared size. In terms of elasticity of the price with
respect to size, we obtain an elasticity of 0.5 which is actually in line with what
obtained for investigations on secondary sales in modern auctions (since Anderson,
1974). The number of figures plays a key role for price formation. More specifically,
each figure brings an increase in painting’s price of around 3 % (we entered also the
square term but the coefficient was not nearly statistically significant). As pointed
out before, there can be a contractual rationale behind this result to limit the moral
hazard of the painters (because the number of human figures was a proxy for the
effort of painters).
Another factor correlated with the price of paintings addressed to churches was
the position where they were planned to be placed (in secular buildings the paintings
were mainly on the walls). In the estimated equation the excluded category is Altar,
24 As noticed by a referee, the lack of information on the total number of commissions (even neglecting
quality differences between them) and on the exact nature of the activity within each workshop makes it
impossible to obtain correct measures of productivity. Our index is only meant to provide a preliminary
attempt to control for productivity.
25 We re-estimated the model without artists’ fixed-effects and we found an adjusted R2 equal to 64%,
suggesting a good fit also reducing considerably the number of the explanatory variables included.
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so that the negative and highly statistically significant coefficient of the Wall
dummy variable points out that artworks produced for this kind of location were
paid much less than altarpieces (-73 %). As explained in the previous section,
because of the presence of a larger number of substitutes for decoration of lateral
walls, especially in churches, the demand elasticity was higher for paintings for
walls than for both altars and ceilings. For this reason, commissioners were ready to
give lower monetary incentives for quality in paintings destined to lateral walls. On
the other hand, we do not find any statistically significant difference between prices
of altarpieces and ceilings, whose demand was more rigid (because of the lack of
substitute decorations and the limited space available for these artworks). Looking
at the impact of the commissioner, we do not find any statistically significant
Table 5 Artist fixed effects
*** p \ 0.01, **p \ 0.05,
*p \ 0.1
Coeff Std err
Balestra 1.410*** 0.388
Bassano 0.206 0.306
BassanoF 0.188 0.385
Carpioni 0.756* 0.457
Cavagna 0.358 0.388
Celesti 0.668** 0.310
Fumiani 0.760* 0.398
Giordano 1.616*** 0.504
Lazzarini 1.119*** 0.407
Liberi 1.799*** 0.309
Maffei 0.818** 0.327
Michieli 1.232*** 0.453
Molinari 0.939* 0.505
Padovanino 0.972** 0.402
Palma Giovane 1.242*** 0.200
Piazzetta 0.887 0.541
PittoniGB 1.055** 0.437
Ricchi 1.173*** 0.375
Ricci 1.203*** 0.336
Ruschi 2.117*** 0.416
Tiepolo 0.687 0.434
Tintoretto 0.397** 0.201
Titian 0.965** 0.380
Triva 1.253** 0.510
VecellioC 0.996** 0.433
Veronese 0.686*** 0.255
Zanchi 1.522*** 0.268
Constant 250.421*** 67.659
Observations 254
Adjusted R2 0.729
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difference between prices of paintings addressed to secular buildings and
altarpieces, while churches’ wall paintings were considerably less paid. Table 4
shows also that the main results do not change, neither in terms of coefficients’
value nor in their statistical significance, when we adopt a multilevel linear
regression approach (columns 3–4) and when we control the time trend with ten-
year dummies (columns 5–6).
The point of sale of the paintings did not matter for the compensation of the
painters in real terms. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that the structure
of this market was endogenous in general equilibrium and painters’ mobility was
arbitraging away price differentials between towns with different demand sizes. As
a matter of fact, in a dynamic perspective any price differential should induce
painters to move toward high price geographical destinations (or send their works
there), which would tend to put downward pressure on the prices of those
geographical destinations and to increase the prices of the other ones.26
Most important, also exported paintings were not paid more in absolute terms,27
but foreign commissioners were simply selecting higher quality paintings by high
quality painters, which is in line with the selection effect pointed out by the
literature on heterogeneity between producers in trade.28
The law of one price is also confirmed when we include dummies for different
subjects such as sacred, mythological and historical paintings or battles (see
columns 7–8 of Table 4; sacred paintings are the reference group)29: price
equalization between different subjects appear to hold, confirming what found by
Etro et al. (2011) not only for this subject classification of figurative paintings but
also for different genres of paintings (figurative versus still lifes, portraits,
landscapes and so on) in Baroque Rome. It should be noticed that the ratio between
the number of commissions for each painter in the dataset and the length of the
career of the painter is not correlated with prices and does not affect the other
results: more accurate investigations on the level of productivity of the painters and
how this could affect prices would be useful.
Finally, let us look at the temporal trend. The date variable is entered as a second-
order polynomial. We find a negative and significant coefficient for the linear term
and a positive and significant coefficient for the quadratic term, showing that, ceteris
paribus, prices were high in late Renaissance and a phase of price decrease at the
beginning of the period under analysis was followed by a stage of growth in prices.
We also re-estimated the model including 10-year time dummy variables to check
for robustness of our results and indeed we find that they are largely unchanged (see
26 See Etro and Colciago (2010) for a recent investigation of endogenous market structures in general
equilibrium models.
27 As noted by a referee, there may have been more uniformity of taste across the Italian cities than was
the case internationally, therefore price equalization between Italian and foreign markets provides a
stronger test for our hypothesis.
28 See Melitz (2003).
29 In the last specification we omitted the dummies on the placement of the paintings because all
mythological paintings and most historical ones were for secular commissioners. We controlled also for
differences between the particular subjects of the paintings (including Christ, scenes of the Annunciation
or the Nativity), but neither coefficient was statistically significant.
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columns 5–6 of Table 4). In order to get a clearer picture of the price time trend, we
re-estimate the baseline equation excluding date and its square and we predict
residuals. In Fig. 2 we plot these residuals on date and its square along with their
confidence interval. The plot clearly shows that the profitability of painting
decreased gradually throughout the first half of the XVII century and started
growing afterwards. The year of minimum compensation for artworks can be
estimated as t ¼ h^1
.
2h^2 which corresponds to 1634, when the price of a
representative painting in real terms was approximately 40 % lower than a century
before and a century later.
This result is potentially consistent with the Schumpeterian hypothesis that prices
affected not only the (endogenous) number of active painters, but also their search
for innovation, productivity and quality: during the sixteenth century, Venice knew
a period of artistic magnificence exemplified by the innovations in the use of color
by Titian, Veronese and Tintoretto, and followed by a strong decline that lasted
through most of the following century (in which leading painters were constantly
replicating the old style). However, at the beginning of the 1700s, a new phase of
grandeur in visual art started, with the innovative works by Tiepolo in fresco
decorations and Canaletto in cityscapes. These shifts to different artistic phases may
be red in terms of the endogeneity of the entry decision in the art market. The late
XVI century was characterized by high supply of local innovative talents30 and
decreasing demand associated with the decline of the Venetian commercial
leadership, which contributed to reduce art prices and, possibly, to generate artistic
decline. The late XVII century and early XVIII century, instead, was characterized
by limited supply of local painters and increasing globalization of the art market
.
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Fig. 2 Price time trend
30 Many of them moved from the countryside to Venice exactly to expoit profitable opportunities, such as
Veronese, Massimo da Verona and Maffeo Verona from Verona, Titian from Pieve di Cadore, the
Bassano’s from Bassano del Grappa, Padovanino from Padua (while Tintoretto was Venetian).
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which lead to new foreign demand31 and higher prices: this, in turn, may have
fostered the artistic rebirth.
After all, the choice to become a painter required some talent and a long training,
but, as any occupational choice, it was largely determined by economic motivations,
namely by its expected compensation. While in the short run painters’ quality
determines prices, in the medium and long run prices may contribute to attract entry
and determine innovative activity and, therefore, higher quality in traditional genres
(or introduction of new genres). More important from a cultural point of view, if
prices and profits were indeed a source of artistic innovation, then one of the
determinants of the path of art history may have been the endogenous structure of
the art market. As the painter and art critic Vasari wrote in his ‘‘Lives of the Most
Excellent Painters, Sculptors, and Architects’’ (1568), ‘‘if in our century there were
enough profits, we would paint greater and better works than the older masters.’’
The same Vasari was the first to mention ‘‘competition’’ as one of the sources of
Florentine leadership in Renaissance art. Obviously, our evidence provides only a
very weak test for this hypothesis, but it points out few suggestions for future
research on the analysis of the endogenous entry of painters in the art market.
4 Conclusion
We have studied the real compensations of painters for important commissions in
the Venetian Republic from Renaissance to the Rococo` age. Our main purpose was
to show that looking at the market for paintings as a full fledged market and
analyzing the contractual aspects of its sales and the endogeneity of its structure
could shed light on the determination of the prices of some of the most valuable
handmade objects of humankind. This is one of the first attempts at investigating
primary markets for art in the past centuries: we believe that additional empirical
analysis may shed new light on our understanding of old and modern art markets
and open a new research space for quantitative explorations in the field of art
history.
Acknowledgments We are thankful to Philip Sohm for extensive comments, and Isabella Cecchini,
James Heckman, David Galenson, Francis Kramarz, Silvia Marchesi, Noemi Pace and Richard Spear for
helpful remarks. The Editor and two anonymous referees provided important comments.
References
Anderson, R. (1974). Paintings as an investment. Economic Inquiry, 12(1), 13–26.
Bajari, P., & Benkard, L. (2005). Demand estimation with heterogeneous consumers and unobserved
product characteristics: A hedonic approach. Journal of Political Economy, 113(6), 1239–1276.
Bartik, T. (1987). The estimation of demand parameters in hedonic price models. Journal of Political
Economy, 95, 81–88.
Baumol, W. (1986). Unnatural value: Or art investment as floating crap game. American Economic
Review, 76(2), 10–14.
31 Not by chance Venice started exporting painters (such as Ricci and Tiepolo), while Canaletto had a
stable demand from foreign turists visiting Venice.
J Cult Econ
123
Brown, J., & Rosen, H. (1982). On the estimation of structural hedonic models. Econometrica, 50,
765–768.
Buelens, N., & Ginsburgh, V. (1993). Revisiting baumol’s unnatural value, or art as investment as a
floating crop game. European Economic Review, 37(7), 1351–1371.
Cecchini, I. (2000). Quadri e Commercio a Venezia durante il Seicento. Venice: Cini Foundation.
Chanel, O., Ge´rard-Varet, L.-A., & Ginsburgh, V. (1996). The relevance of hedonic price indices, The
case of paintings. Journal of Cultural Economics, 20, 1–24.
Dal Pozzolo, E., & Tedoldi, L. (Eds.). (2003). Tra Committenza e Collezionismo. Venice: Cini
Foundation.
De Marchi, N. (1995). The role of Dutch auctions and lotteries in shaping the art market(s) of 17th-
century Holland. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 28, 203–221.
Dorchy, L., & Ginsburgh, V. (1993). Price trends for English and French silver. Arts, Antiques, Auctions,
240, 152–155.
Etro, F. (2006). Aggressive leaders. RAND Journal of Economics, 37(Spring), 146–154.
Etro, F., & Colciago, A. (2010). Endogenous market structures and the business cycle. Economic Journal,
120(549), 1201–1234.
Etro, F., Marchesi, S. & Pagani, L. (2011). The labor market in the seventeenth century Italian art sector,
University of Venice, Ca’ Foscari, Department of Economics, W.P. 23.
Etro, F., & Pagani, L. (2012). The market for paintings in Italy during the seventeenth century. Journal of
Economic History, 72(2), 423–447.
Fantoni, M., Matthew, L., & Matthews-Grieco, S. (Eds.). (2003). The Art Market in Italy. Ferrara: Panini.
Frey, B., & Pommerehne, W. (1989). Muses and Markets. Explorations in the economics of the arts,
Oxford: Blackwell.
Galenson, D., & Weinberg, B. (2000). Age and the quality of work: The case of modern American
painters. Journal of Political Economy, 108(4), 761–777.
Ge´rin-Jean, P. (2003). Prices of works of art and hierarchy of artistic value on the Italian Market
(1400–1700), in Fantoni et al. (2003).
Greif, A., Milgrom, P., & Weingast, B. (1994). Coordination, commitment and enforcement: The case of
the merchant gild. Journal of Political Economy, 102(4), 745–776.
Holmstrom, B. (1979). Moral hazard and observability. Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), 74–91.
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991). Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset
ownership, and job design. Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 7, 24–52.
Locatelli-Biey, M., & Zanola, R. (1999). Investment in painting: A short-run price index. Journal of
Cultural Economics, 23(3), 209–219.
Malanima, P. (2002). L’Economia Italiana. Dalla crescita medievale alla crescita contemporanea,
Bologna: Il Mulino.
Mei, J., & Moses, M. (2002). Art as investment and the underperformance of masterpieces: Evidence
from 1875–2002. American Economic Review, 92(5), 1656–1668.
Melitz, M. (2003). The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate industry
productivity. Econometrica, 71(6), 1695–1725.
Montias, J. M. (2002). Art at Auction in 17th Century Amsterdam. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University
Press.
Nahm, J. (2010). Price determinants and genre effects in the Korean art market: A partial linea analysis of
size effects. Journal of Cultural Economics, 34, 281–297.
Nerlove, M. (1995). Hedonic price functions and the measurement of preferences: The case of Swedish
wine consumers. European Economic Review, 39, 1697–1716.
O’Malley, M. (2005). The Business of Art. Contracts and the Commissioning Process in Renaissance
Italy. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Palmquist, R. (1984). Estimating the demand for characterisitics of housing. Review of Economics and
Statistics, 66, 394–404.
Rengers, M., & Velthuis, O. (2002). Determinants of prices for contemporary art in Amsterdam art
galleries 1992–1998. Journal of Cultural Economics, 26(2), 1–28.
Rosen, S. (1974). Hedonic prices and implicit markets: Product differentiation in pure competition.
Journal of Political Economy, 82, 34–55.
Sohm, P. (2010). Venice, Chapter 5 in Spear and Sohm (2010).
Spear, R. & Sohm, P. (2010). Painting for profit. The economic lives of seventeenth-century Italian
Painters, New Haven: Yale University Press.
J Cult Econ
123
Vaubel, R. (2005). The role of competition in the rise of baroque and renaissance music. Journal of
Cultural Economics, 29, 277–297.
Witte, A., Sumka, H., & Erekson, H. (1979). An estimation of a structural hedonic price model of the
housing market: An application of Rosen’s theory of implicit markets. Econometrica, 47,
1151–1173.
J Cult Econ
123
